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This paper attempts to explore the historical origins of the “totalistic 
iconoclasm” that was characteristic of Chinese intellectual history in the 
twentieth century. By examining Wei Yuan’s historical writings, the paper 
argues that the conceptual connection between the civilization of the majority 
Han ethnicity (“the Chinese tradition”) and the idea of a political entity of 
China had already broken down by mid-nineteenth century. The Qing 
Empire’s political adoption and control of Confucianism suffocated its 
intellectual creativity and thus Confucianism only existed as custom and in 
form. As an intellectual reaction to these political manipulations, the 
essentialist thoughts of the late Ming gradually gave way to the pragmatist 
thoughts of late Qing. This separation of cultural and political entities in the 
minds of the Chinese intellectual elite as a response to the Qing Empire’s 
manipulation of Confucianism set up the condition for the total cultural 











          One of the most distinctive phenomena of twentieth-century Chinese history was 
the deeply influential and widespread mentality and practice of “antitraditionalism.” This 
strong tide against the Chinese tradition has been described by scholars of Chinese 
history as “totalistic iconoclasm.”1 This intellectual trend had a profound influence on the 
trajectory Chinese history took in the twentieth century. Many scholars of the May Fourth 
movement identify the May Fourth period (approximately between 1917 and 1924) as the 
heyday of this antitraditionalism, and some scholars have even proposed to view the 
entire history of 20th century China in the shadow of this theme of antitraditionalism.2 
          Compared to historians of China who simply describe or take for granted this 
phenomenon of antitraditionalism, fewer ask the question of why. Many scholars of 
Chinese intellectual history have studied intellectual figures in the late nineteenth and 
early twentieth centuries, pointing out the anti-traditional elements in these intellectual 
figures during their encounter with western modernity.3 However, not many have tried to 
                                                          
1
 Lin Yu-Sheng, The Crisis of Chinese Consciousness: Radical Antitraditionalism in the May Fourth Era (Madison: 
University of Wisconsin Press, 1979). 
2
 For example, Rana Mitter’s recent book on modern China holds such a view. See Rana Mitter, A Bitter Revolution: 
China’s Struggle with the Modern World (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005). This book has been unofficially 
endorsed by institutions such as the University of Oxford as the standard textbook on modern China. 
3
 The early pioneering study in the West on China’s anti-traditional intellectual trajectory is Benjamin Schwartz’s In 
Search of Wealth and Power: Yen Fu and the West (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of the Harvard University Press, 
1964), analyzing Yan Fu’s adaptation and upholding of western learning in the late 1890s. After the publication of this 
book, many other historians followed Schwartz and studied the period between 1890 and 1930 elaborating on the 
phenomenon of antitraditionalism. In the early 1970s, Hao Chang and Philip C. C. Huang wrote about the late Qing and 
early Republican figure Liang Qichao (Hao Chang, Liang Ch’i-ch’ao and Intellectual Transition in China, 1890-1907, 
London: Oxford University Press, 1971 and Philip C. C. Huang, Liang Ch’i-ch’ao and Modern Chinese Liberalism, 
Seattle and London: University of Washington Press, 1972). Hao Chang’s Chinese Intellectuals in Crisis: Search for 
Order and Meaning, 1890-1911 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987) also focuses on the late Qing and 
early Republican period. Other important works on the intellectual history of 19th to 20th century China, such as those 
by D. W. Y. Kwok (Scientism in Chinese thought, 1900–1950, New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1965), 
Lin Yu-Sheng (The Crisis of Chinese Consciousness), and Jerome B. Grieder (Hu Shih and the Chinese Renaissance: 
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explore the reason for such elements, and seem to take this phenomenon of 
antitraditionalism as natural. Yet if we put this phenomenon into a comparative 
perspective, we can clearly see its uniqueness in world history. Not only is this 
phenomenon unique (or even counterintuitive, some might say) when compared to 
modern European states in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, it is a distinctive 
direction even compared to other non-Western political and cultural entities (colonial 
India and the Japanese Empire, for example). 4  This almost antagonistic relationship 
between cultural tradition and political survival in the modern Chinese mind urges us to 
look back in time and explore its possible explanations. 
          The modern method of historical periodization creates a problem in the continuity 
of historical inquiry in the field of sixteenth-to-twentieth-century China, which in effect 
discourages the study of the social and intellectual origin of the antitraditionalism of 
twentieth century China. The study of Chinese history in (especially western) academic 
institutions is commonly separated into “imperial China” (221 BCE to 1911 CE, but 
many stop at around 1800 or 1840) and “modern China” (most commonly dated 1840 till 
after 1989, but the starting point remains in dispute).5 Specialists in the two fields often 
                                                                                                                                                                             
Liberalism in the Chinese Revolution, 1917-1937. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1970.) all wrote on the 
Republican period. One of the latest important books on the intellectual history of the late Qing to the Republican 
period is Xiaobing Tang, Global Space and the NationaIist Discourse of Modernity: The Historical Thinking of Liang 
Qichao (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1996), which also does not go beyond the upper boundary of 1890. 
4
 For more information on the situation in India compared to China, see Chao Ren, “Revisiting Tagore’s Visit to China: 
Nation, Tradition, and Modernity in China and India in the Early Twentieth Century,” in ASIANetwork Exchange: A 
Journal for Asian Studies in the Liberal Arts, Vol. 18, No. 2 (Spring 2011). 
5
 There are two most widely accepted starting points in the periodization of “modern China.” The first one sets the 
starting point at around 1840. This periodization method is accepted by official historiography in mainland China, and 
is also widely accepted by Marxist historians in the West. This method emphasizes foreign imperialist aggression in 
China (as a stage of global capitalism) and the Chinese resistance to it starting with the Opium War. For intellectual 
history, this method recognizes the change in the Chinese intellectual world from a more tradition-oriented way of 
thinking to a more anti-tradition-dominated one. However, since this method set the upper boundary at year 1840, it 
fails to address sufficiently the issue of intellectual continuity and the rather slow and complicated process of 
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do not communicate much with each other (for example, the historian of modern China at 
a very prestigious institution in the UK never attends any talks or events on pre-modern 
or imperial China). This historical periodization and the lack of communication among 
specialists of different periods pose a big problem for the students of intellectual history: 
not much scholarship has made the attempt to associate the new intellectual 
developments of the late Qing (1840 to 1911) with the intellectual history of late imperial 
China (circa. 900 to 1800). 
          This essay aspires to bridge this gap. By examining the historical writings of Wei 
Yuan and other sources from late Qing, I would like to argue for a two-stage decline of 
the Confucian tradition in late imperial China: first, the decline of the original intellectual 
creativity of the Confucian tradition, brought about by the Manchu official adoption of 
Confucianism in its attempt to legitimize the regime; second, the decline of the form and 
custom of the Confucian tradition at the fall of the imperial order in 1911. This two-stage 
decline of the Confucian tradition, especially the first stage, was an important reason that 
led to the separation of the political and cultural entities in late Qing Chinese thought. 
This separation paved the way for the strong anti-tradition sentiment in an era of national 
political crisis, which ended up in the form of the totalistic iconoclasm of twentieth-
century China. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                             
intellectual changes. The other periodization method marks dates the beginning of “modern China” back to the time 
before the Manchu conquest of China Proper around 1600 to 1644. Many modernization historians in the West prefer 
this method over the previous one and often present a teleological narrative of China embracing the modern (western) 
world (the most famous example is, of course, Jonathan D. Spence’s widely used textbook, The Search for Modern 
China. New York: W. W. Norton, 1999). This method puts more emphasis on the teleological political narrative and 
also fails to provide a satisfactory account of the process of the intellectual changes. 
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In order to explore the intellectual origin of the anti-tradition sentiment in late Qing 
China, I turned to the pioneer figure Wei Yuan (1794-1857). I chose him because of his 
special status in the intellectual history of late imperial China: Wei Yuan has been most 
widely recognized as the first person to actively introduce the knowledge of the West into 
China and the first Chinese to pay any serious attention to the West in the Qing Dynasty. 
His many writings were influential not only in retrospect but also contemporarily as well. 
Therefore, I hope to bring the question of totalistic iconoclasm eighty years backward and 
interrogate its possible origins and explanations in Wei Yuan’s writings. 
 
 
Wei Yuan: the man and his work 
 
          Wei Yuan has been almost consensually and universally regarded by historians as 
one of the earliest great figures in the intellectual history of modern China, starting with 
the crisis of the Opium War. Wei Yuan was born in 1794 in Shaoyang County of Hunan 
Province in South Central China. He was well educated in the lixue (“learning of the 
principle”) Neo-Confucianism very early on in his life. In 1822, he passed the second 
stage of the three-stage Civil Service Examinations, and in preparation for the final 
“Court Examination,” he settled down in the imperial capital of Beijing. During his stay, 
he was seriously influenced by his cohorts and his personal reading and became one of 
the key members of the “New Text” school of Confucian classicism, which recognized 
the value of the Confucian classics because of their practical value as guidance to 
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political governance, as opposed to the lixue masters who valued the classics because of 
their metaphysical philosophical sophistication. 6  He joined the group of influential 
classicists who were also pragmatic reformers in politics because of their exegetic 
background. Because of his personal connections, he was soon promoted to be the 
secretary of a provincial chief in Jiangsu Province. 
          During his lifetime, Wei Yuan was most famous for his serving as the principal 
editor of the 1826 Compendium of Writings on Statecraft from the Present Imperial 
Dynasty (Huangchao jingshi wenbian). This collection of essays was topically arranged 
and covered almost every aspect of social organization and policy. The Compendium was 
very widely circulated and, as historian William T. Rowe describes, “served as the bible 
of statecraft reformists for decades afterward and spawned many sequels throughout the 
remainder of the empire.”7 
          However, the Compendium was not his most famous work of all. He was most 
famous in posterity for his book Illustrated Gazetteer on the Maritime States (Haiguo 
tuzhi), a compilation of geographical and cultural information about the countries of the 
world first finished in 1844 (and updated multiple times in the next fifteen years or so). 
This book received little attention in China until later in the century when the book was 
introduced into Japan and served as an eye-opener for the Japanese before the Meiji 
Restoration. In academic monographs and articles both in Chinese and in English, the 
                                                          
6
 Li Hu, Wei Yuan yanjiu (Studies on Wei Yuan) (Beijing: Zhaohua chuban she, 2002), 21-22. 
7
 William T. Rowe, China’s Last Empire: The Great Qing (Cambridge, Mass.: The Belknap Press of Harvard 
University Press, 2009), 161. 
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Gazetteer is also the most studied among all of Wei Yuan’s works.8 The most famous 
line of all time by Wei Yuan was, in his preface to the Gazetteer when he talked about his 
intentions, that he wrote the book in order “to learn from the foreigners in order to 
contain the foreigners” (shi yi chang ji yi zhi yi).9 
          It is worth noting that Wei Yuan put the foreigners in a position to be learned from, 
a position of being a teacher (the teacher-student relationship was an important hierarchy 
in society according to the Confucian teaching). Traditionally speaking, for a Chinese 
scholar, the difference between the Chinese (hua) and the “foreigners” or “barbarians” (yi) 
was irreconcilable.10 There was even an idiomatic term for this distinction. “Barbarians,” 
especially “barbarians” from the geographical peripheries of the Chinese world, were 
considered uncivilized, harmful, and sometimes inhuman. The northern “barbarians” 
were the most dangerous, because they are the nomadic people from the areas of harsh 
climate, always threatening to invade the fertile agrarian fields of North China. Battles of 
the Chinese against the northern barbarians had existed since the very early days of the 
Chinese empire during the Qin times (221-207 BCE), marked by a geographical 
landmark, the Great Wall. Such wars were considered a protection not only of the 
geographical areas of China proper, but more importantly, human civilization. According 
to this line of thought, the distinction between the Chinese and the barbarians was 
                                                          
8 The most comprehensive study of Wei Yuan in the English language is Jane Kate Leonard, Wei Yüan and China's 
Rediscovery of the Maritime World (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1984). This book discusses the 
influence Wei Yuan had on the military policies but ignores the intellectual implications of Wei Yuan’s thought, 
especially in relation to a larger picture of intellectual history in late imperial China. 
9
 Wei Yuan, Haiguo tuzhi yuan xu (Original preface to the Illustrated Gazetteer on the Maritime States), in Wei Yuan 
quanji (Complete works of Wei Yuan) (Changsha: Yuelu shushe, 2004), vol. 4, 1. 
10 For convenience, this essay uses the word “Chinese” to refer to the Han Chinese ethnicity. This usage of the word 
“Chinese” may potentially cause some confusion, but it was more historically accurate in the worldview of the 
traditional Chinese civilization, or the Sinospheric world. 
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essentially about the preservation of human civilization. By making such a statement as 
to learn from the foreigners or barbarians, Wei Yuan challenged the very idea of human 




Wei Yuan and a historiography of “barbarian” dynasties 
 
          If we can argue that the word “foreigners” or “barbarians” in Wei Yuan’s famous 
quote was referring to the British and other western powers and not to the traditional 
concept of “barbarian” peoples of the north, his other works definitely bring our attention 
to the latter. Apart from the two aforementioned works, the two other lengthy works most 
highly regarded by Wei Yuan himself were two histories of the only two dynasties in 
imperial China founded by “barbarian” peoples: the Yuan Dynasty (1271-1368, by the 
Mongols) and the Qing Dynasty (1644-1912, by the Manchus). In 1842, the year in 
which the famous Treaty of Nanking between the Qing Empire and the United Kingdom 
was signed, Wei Yuan finished his fourteen-book Military History of the Glorious 
Dynasty (Sheng wu ji), a history of military conquests of the Qing Dynasty, during which 
Wei Yuan lived. He wrote this military history hoping to establish an example for the 
current imperial court, policy makers, and all scholar officials regarding military issues. 
If these people followed the precedent examples, Wei Yuan said, “why would we worry 
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about the barbarians on the four edges of the world, and why would we worry about the 
humiliations!”11 
          The other more lengthy history of the “barbarian” dynasty was the gigantic, multi-
volume Newly Compiled History of the Yuan Dynasty, finished around 1853. After 
writing the Military History and the Illustrated Gazetteer, Wei Yuan turned back 
chronologically to another historical topic for an answer to the crisis the Chinese empire 
was facing. He sought the key to might and power in the historical experience of the 
Mongol Empire, which conquered the entire China proper in 1279, established the Yuan 
Dynasty, and maintained power for almost a hundred years. The Yuan Dynasty was 
famous for its size: the western boundary of the empire for the first time reached the 
entire Tibetan Plateau, and the northern boundary extended as far as the climate allowed 
human activity (some maps have argued that the Yuan northern boundary actually 
extended all the way up to the Arctic Ocean).12 Wei Yuan considered the Yuan as a great 
example of military power and conquest in the frontiers from which the later generations 
could learn. He wrote in the preface to the book: 
 
Yuan possessed all that was under the sky: the vastness of its area, the 
abundance of its logistics, the greatness of its military power, exceeded Han 
and Tang. … internally it did not have political chaos caused by the court or 
the eunuchs, while externally it did not have the need to worry about exacting 
the frontier people to fight the barbarian enemies. … A precedent is the 
teacher of the posterity. Yuan started outside of the Wall and gained the 
                                                          
11
 Wei Yuan, Sheng wu ji xu (Preface to the Military History of the Glorious Dynasty), in Wei Yuan quanji (Complete 
works of Wei Yuan) (Changsha: Yuelu shushe, 2004), vol. 3, 1. 
12 
“Yuan shiqi quantu” (Complete map of the Yuan period), in Tan Qixiang, ed., Zhongguo lishi ditu ji (Collected 
historical maps of China), vol. 7: Yuan and Ming (Beijing: Zhongguo ditu chubanshe, 1996), 10-11. 
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central plains, … its historical experiences should be the guiding mirror for 
hundreds of generations.13 
 
“Han” and “Tang” were commonly considered the two greatest and most economically, 
militarily, and culturally prosperous empires in Chinese history established by the 
Chinese themselves. Here Wei Yuan made a comparison between the great Chinese 
empires and the great barbarian empire of Yuan, praising the latter over the former. Wei 
Yuan wrote this multi-volume history hoping to remind people of the past glory of the 
Yuan Dynasty, wishing to revive the glory of the vast empire amidst the crisis-bound 
Qing Empire, in the aftermath of a disappointing war (the Opium War) and in the middle 
of domestic turmoil (the Taiping Rebellion). 
          Apart from these histories of the two “barbarian” empires, Wei Yuan also wrote a 
history of the Liao Empire (907-1125), a powerful empire on the north of China proper 
founded by the Khitan people. The Liao Empire was also famous for its military power 
and its constant threat to the northern boundary of the Chinese empire of Song in China 
proper. Again, the book had very high praises for the “barbarian” dynasty, especially its 
first emperor.14 However, the manuscript of this history of the Liao Empire was burnt and 
destroyed by the “local rebellious people” (likely members of the Taiping Rebellion) in 
                                                          
13 Wei Yuan, Ni jincheng Yuan shi xinbian biao (Preface to the planned submission of the Newly Compiled History of 
the Yuan Dynasty), in Wei Yuan quanji (Complete works of Wei Yuan) (Changsha: Yuelu shushe, 2004), vol. 8, 4-6. It 
should be pointed out here that the word “submission” in the title was not a submission to the imperial court. At this 
time, Wei Yuan was a local municipal official in Gaoyou, Jiangsu Province. He did not have the access to submit 
directly to the imperial court. Instead, this “submission,” if it really happened, might be directed towards the provincial 
level official of Jiangsu or other provinces. See Wei Yuan quanji, vol. 20, 779. 
14 Wei Yuan, Shu Liao taizu shi (On the first emperor of Liao), in Wei Yuan quanji (Complete works of Wei Yuan) 
(Changsha: Yuelu shushe, 2004), vol. 12, 215-217. 
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his home province of Hunan in 1852 and did not survive, apart from a few passages on 
the first emperor.15 
          It was surprising that Wei Yuan sought the solutions for the crisis of China in these 
“barbarian” dynasties, given the brutality related to the “barbarian” conquests in the 
public memories. When the Mongols conquered China proper and established the Yuan 
Dynasty in Beijing, the Yuan government established a four-caste system in the empire, 
with the Mongols at the top, “Semu” peoples (various non-Chinese northern nomadic 
people) as the second, “hanren” (“Han Chinese people” in North China, formerly under 
the control of the Jurchen Empire of Jin), and “nanren” (“Southern people,” the Han 
Chinese in South China formerly under the control of the Chinese Empire of Song).16 The 
Chinese people in China proper were placed in the two lowest castes of the society. Many 
political devices were designed to enforce local control of the Chinese area. During the 
Yuan Dynasty and known to later generations, the Chinese people were severely 
oppressed by the Mongols. 
          On the other hand, when the Manchus conquered China proper in 1644, the 
Manchu rulers enforced a rule to change the hairstyle of all Chinese males to the Manchu 
hairstyle of queues in order to show their submission and loyalty to the Manchu overlord. 
Hair-cutting was a big taboo in the Confucian tradition, in which a man’s hair was 
believed to be given by the parents and hair-cutting was believed to be a violation of filial 
                                                          
15 
“Wei Yuan dashi nianbiao” (Chronicle of Wei Yuan’s major life activities), in Wei Yuan quanji (Complete works of 
Wei Yuan) (Changsha: Yuelu shushe, 2004), vol. 20, 776-777. 
16 Jonathan N. Lipman, Familiar Strangers: A History of Muslims in Northwest China (Hong Kong: Hong Kong 
University Press, 1998), 33. 
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piety, the utmost good in Confucianism.17 The rule at the time was phrased as “keep your 
head or keep your hair,” which fostered large-scale local resistance movements in the 
Yangtze River Delta area. Atrocious massacres upon the Chinese resistance took place in 
towns of Yangzhou, Jiading, and Jiangyin. An account written by an eyewitness of the 
Yangzhou massacre, Wang Xiuchu’s A Record of Ten Days at Yangzhou (Yangzhou shiri 
ji), circulated for centuries underground since its first appearance in 1645. The book was 
a narrative of the massacre and a catalogue of the atrocities committed by the Manchus 
on the Chinese at the time of the conquest, which remained vivid in the popular cultural 
memories of the Chinese in the following centuries.18 
          With these brutalities in the popular memory of “barbarian” conquests and rule of 
China, it was surprising how Wei Yuan, as a Chinese himself with a queue behind his 
head, was actively seeking a road to prosperity for China almost exclusively from the 
histories of the “barbarian” empires. What made him take this leap out of his own ethnic 
and cultural experience and learn from his very own oppressors? 
          Another interesting aspect in Wei Yuan’s historiography worthy of our attention 
was his idea on the use of history. In the early traditions of Chinese historical writing, 
history was used to record past events as well as provide metahistorical moral 
instructions.19  Later, after the institutionalization of historical writing in the form of 
“Historiographical Offices” (shi guan) in the Tang Dynasty, the writing of history 
                                                          
17 
“Our bodies - to every hair and bit of skin - are received by us from our parents, and we must not presume to injure or 
wound them. This is the beginning of filial piety.” Xiaojing (The Classic on Filial Piety) ch. 1, trans. James Legge. 
Online source: http://ctext.org/xiao-jing/zh?en=on. 
18 Rowe, China’s Last Empire, 23-24. 
19 P. van der Loon, “The Ancient Chinese Chronicles and the Growth of Historical Ideals,” in W. G. Beasley and E. G. 
Pulleyblank, eds., Historians of China and Japan (London: Oxford University Press, 1961), 24-25. 
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became increasingly a tool for the purpose of providing legitimacy for the current 
regime.20 Each dynasty produced a history of the previous dynasty and established its 
own legitimacy as the successor of the “Mandate of Heaven” in the narrative and moral 
judgments in the histories. For Wei Yuan, however, history had more practical uses: 
history served as a technical teacher for the later generations. What was to be learned 
from history was not, according to Wei Yuan, the moral teachings and judgments, but the 
technical experiences of human life across different cultures and different ethnicities. 
Both the classical notion of history and Wei Yuan’s concept of history embodied 
universalism, but the two had different interpretations of this universal experience 
(morality and technical experiences.) 
 
 
The separation of cultural and political entities in late imperial Chinese 
thought 
 
          How should we explain Wei Yuan’s choice of technical experience over cultural 
and ethnic considerations in historical writings? His case was not exceptional: many 
scholar-reformers of the period of the “statecraft” school (jingshi) embraced this 
pragmatic attitude in cultural and intellectual discourses. Why did these people, both in 
and out of the imperial bureaucracy, choose to take such a position when China was 
facing a huge crisis both internally and externally? 
                                                          
20 For the Tang institutionalization of historical writing, see Denis Twitchett, The Writing of Official History under the 
T’ang (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 3-55. 
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          In response to this question I just raised above, a more self-reflective further 
question would be: what were the other possible historical options or alternatives? If we 
look back to the late Ming period, we can see a very different kind of attitude toward 
foreign knowledge and foreign learning: In late Ming, the intellectual world’s response to 
the influx of western learning was more defensive and essentialist. When the Jesuit 
missionaries of the West brought to China with them western knowledge of geography 
(especially maps) and astronomy in the 1500s, this knowledge had a very strong appeal to 
the Chinese intellectuals, who were surprised by its accuracy (especially in predicting 
eclipses and reporting earthquakes). The knowledge of western science soon posed a 
huge challenge to the worldview and cosmology of the Chinese intellectuals: the very 
foundation of the traditional moral and political ideal was shaken by the observational 
science from the West. In response to this, some Ming intellectuals proposed a re-
establishment of Confucianism as a state religion to ensure the essence of the Chinese 
civilization, although meanwhile they also enjoyed entertaining their minds with western 
technology.21 To these Chinese intellectuals, the philosophical and spiritual essence of 
Confucianism was at the center of the survival of the civilization. 
          When the Ming Dynasty fell and the Manchus came to rule China proper in the 
1640s, Chinese intellectuals had a very radical response. No other Chinese dynasty had 
produced so many loyalists after its fall. As I mentioned above, the traditional distinction 
between the Chinese and the foreigners was considered one between civilization and non-
civilization. Therefore, when the Manchu empire took over its predecessor, many 
                                                          
21 Ge Zhaoguang, Zhongguo sixiang shi, di’er juan: qi shiji zhi shijiu shiji Zhongguo de zhishi, sixiang yu xinyang (An 
intellectual history of China, vol. 2: Chinese knowledge, thoughts, and beliefs from the 7th to the 19th centuries) 
Shanghai: Fudan daxue chubanshe (Fudan University Press), 2004, 383. 
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Chinese intellectuals made a distinction between “the fall of the regime/dynasty” (wang 
guo) and “the fall of the civilization” (wang tianxia).22 This distinction separated the 
political entity of regime or dynasty, which was technical in its nature and in a certain 
degree value-neutral, and the cultural entity of civilization, which carried heavy moral 
values. Many Chinese intellectuals during this period believed the Manchu conquest was 
not merely a dynastic change but more significantly the decline and fall of the (universal) 
civilization. As loyalists, they were loyal to the civilization, embodied in the Confucian 
tradition. The anti-Manchu sentiment in the first few decades of the Qing Dynasty was an 
expression of cultural essentialism and an effort to protect the intellectual heritage of the 
Chinese civilization. This distinction made by the Ming loyalists was the first major 
attempt to conceptually distinguish the political and cultural entities of China. 
          The culturally essentialist responses of the late Ming intellectuals to both the 
western knowledge and the Manchu conquest of China proper presented a historical 
alternative to the issue of cultural and technical considerations. As the Ming fell, Chinese 
loyalist intellectuals held firm to the “civilization” in order to save the nation. In the 19th 
century, however, Wei Yuan and other reformist intellectuals put national salvation in 
front of the missions to preserve the “civilization” (even though he himself was educated 
early in his life as a Neo-Confucian scholar). This consolidation of the separation of 
political and cultural entities and the triumph of one over the other could only be 
explained by the historical process that happened between these two points of time: the 
Qing governance of China and its control of the Confucian tradition. 
                                                          





The Qing Empire and Confucianism: adoption, control, and the Chinese 
reaction 
 
          The Qing Empire’s attitude toward the Confucian tradition was an ambivalent one: 
on one hand, the imperial court wanted to use the Confucian tradition as a tool to 
legitimize itself and make itself more culturally acceptable as a ruling regime in China 
proper; on the other hand, the imperial court tried very hard to suppress and censor 
original intellectual creativity of the Confucian tradition which might develop into a 
justification for the idea of a Chinese “civilization” or a reinforcement of the distinction 
between the Chinese and the “barbarian.” These two aspects combined facilitated (though 
not consciously intended to) the separation of political and cultural entities in the Chinese 
mind in late imperial China. 
          The Qing imperial court actively adopted Confucianism as a cultural label in order 
to provide legitimacy for itself to rule China proper. After militarily conquering the entire 
area of the empire, the Manchu regime recognized the importance of establishing its 
legitimacy to rule. In more than one way, the Manchu rulers tried to establish this 
legitimacy in action and in ideology throughout a period of more than a hundred years. 
For example, one of the most visible and costly means of legitimization was the multiple 
imperial tourings of the Qianlong Emperor in the 18th century to the economically and 
culturally prosperous Yangtze River Delta area, the region most heavily affected by the 
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atrocities of conquest and still haunted by the anti-Manchu sentiment. The rituals and 
symbolism involved in these imperial tourings were a declaration of Qing legitimacy and 
also a “negotiation” between the Manchu ruler and the Chinese.23 
          The Qing imperial court’s adoption of Confucianism as the imperial ideology was 
one such method of legitimization. The Qing imperial court made an effort to educate the 
princes in the Chinese language (alongside the Manchu language) and Confucian classics. 
Starting from the second emperor of the Qing Dynasty in China proper (Emperor Kangxi), 
the Manchu emperors were all well-versed in the Confucian classics. The court 
deliberately promoted the emperors’ images as Manchu rulers with Chinese learning. In 
the early 1700s, the Qing emperor had already gained the monopolizing right to moral 
truth. In the 1730s, Emperor Yongzheng was confident enough to make a judgment about 
the Confucian learning, saying that “the Confucian learning has been not pure for 
generations; true learning and fake learning are mixed together confusing people’s 
minds.” 24  Statements like this declared the strong relationship and close connection 
between the Qing imperial court and the Confucian tradition, which had previously been 
recognized as the imperial ideology starting from before 100 BCE. In embracing the 
Confucian discourses and the knowledge of the classics, the Qing emperors connected 
themselves with the “Mandate of Heaven” which was the most important criterion for the 
legitimacy of a universal ruler in the sinosphere that was supposed to have permeated all 
cyclical dynastic changes in Chinese history. 
                                                          
23 For a detailed study of the imperial tourings as a tool to establish legitimacy, see Michael G. Chang, A Court on 
Horseback: Imperial Touring and the Construction of Qing Rule, 1680-1785 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University 
Asia Center, 2007). 
24 Ge Zhaoguang, Zhongguo sixiang shi (An intellectual history of China), vol. 2, 392. 
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          This close tie between the Qing imperial court and the Confucian tradition 
alienated the loyalist intellectuals from enthusiastic engagement with Confucian 
discourses. Those loyalists who maintained hope after the fall of the Ming Dynasty and 
wanted to re-establish the world order according to Confucian ideals moved away from 
Confucianism because of its association with their enemy: the Qing court. The retreat of 
the Chinese intellectuals from Confucian discourses gave the Qing court more space to 
monopolize the right to interpret the Confucian tradition. Also, the Qing court’s advocacy 
of Confucian moral values left no room for the loyalists to voice any real opposition, 
since doing so would be inviting the accusation of being immoral. The loyalists either 
conformed to the Qing authority or kept silent on the issue of court-adopted Confucian 
tradition. 
          The other aspect of the relationship between the Qing imperial court and the 
Confucian tradition was the court effort to censor all aspects of writing and suppress 
original intellectual creativity, especially among the Chinese. This literary inquisition 
reached its highest point in the heyday of the Qing Empire. According to historian Liu 
Yizheng, “The intensity of the sufferings of literary people [from inquisition] in the 
previous dynasties had never been as severe as it was in the Qing Dynasty. Therefore, 
since the time of Yongzheng and Qianlong [1722-1796], literary gentlemen with 
aspiration and integrity had been nowhere to be found. … Any slight carelessness might 
bring unexpected disasters.”25 The breadth and depth of the literary inquisition in the 
                                                          
25 Liu Yizheng, Zhongguo wenhua shi, xia ce (A cultural history of China, vol. 2) (Shanghai: Zhonguo da baike 
quanshu chuban she, 1988), 731. 
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Qing was the most serious of all imperial dynasties. Several famous cases took place and 
many people were involved throughout the society. 
          The literary inquisition was originally used to prevent the Chinese from making 
any move towards the formation and spreading of anti-Manchu sentiments, but because 
of its prevalence, in effect it suffocated intellectual creativity and scared people away 
from active intellectual conversations. The inquisition specifically kept people away from 
the philosophical discussions of Neo-Confucianism. In the lixue school of Neo-
Confucianism, philosophical enquiries were the foundation of moral and political orders 
of the world. Therefore, even metaphysical discussions might have a strong political 
implication. The censorship and literary inquisition of the Qing Dynasty significantly 
discouraged philosophical discussions. Partially in response to this oppression in the 
intellectual realm, Chinese intellectuals turned away from active philosophical 
engagements and turned toward “evidentiary scholarship”: the philological examinations 
of the Confucian classics. These studies were not politically dangerous so they survived 
the censorship of the Qing authorities. Meanwhile, with a strong emphasis put on the 
technical rather than philosophical aspect of Confucian classics, the intellectual creativity 
within the Confucian tradition went into decline. Throughout the eighteenth century, 
Confucian scholarship made great achievements in textual criticism of the classics, but 
had almost no breakthrough in philosophical sophistication.26 
          This enforcement of literary inquisition and censorship caused a big turn in the 
trajectory of intellectual development in late imperial China. Chinese intellectuals 
                                                          
26 Benjamin A. Elman, From Philosophy to Philology: Intellectual and Social Aspects of Change in Late Imperial 
China (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1984), 5-6. 
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retreated from active participation in Confucian philosophical discussions, and left a 
vacuum for the imperial power to fill. The official adoption and use of Confucianism as 
imperial ideology also alienated many Chinese intellectuals, who were initially more 
inclined towards the loyalists’ side but later found the Confucian tradition increasingly 
less appealing because of its association with the imperial rule and the imperial 
bureaucracy (in its institutionalized form of Civil Service Examinations). Therefore, 
though unintended, the Qing policies on Confucianism caused the detachment of Chinese 
intellectuals from the tradition. 
          To the late Ming loyalists, the Confucian tradition represented the universal 
civilization of human beings, which had the great power of preserving this civilization 
even though the political form of this civilization fell; to the 19th-century Qing reformers, 
the Confucian tradition represented the intellectually static and unchanging imperial 
bureaucracy, which repeated the ideological cliché in all aspects of social life. In the mid-
eighteenth century, novelist Wu Jingzi wrote a satirical novel named The Scholars (Rulin 
waishi), making fun of the adult students for the Civil Service Examinations and mocking 
the lack of intellectual creativity of this era.27 This novel became widely read in the 
generations after him, who all shared a strong feeling of criticism of this intellectual 
inactivity. 
          The Manchu conquest and rule of China, including its policies adopting and 
controlling the Confucian tradition, had a big impact on the intellectual world of Chinese 
thinkers which alienated Chinese intellectuals from the Confucian tradition. In the mid-
                                                          
27 Wu Jingzi, Rulin waishi (translated as The Scholars). Beijing: Renmin wenxue chuban she, 2002. 
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nineteenth century, there was already a clear separation of political and cultural entities in 
the mind of reformist thinkers such as Wei Yuan. In the light of the two hundred years of 
Manchu rule, it is easier for us to understand the historical origins of this unique 
intellectual phenomenon in China, which made Wei Yuan feel comfortable offering 
examples of “barbarian” history for the betterment of the Chinese nation. Yet Wei Yuan 
was only the beginning of a long list of thinkers and writers (Wang Tao, Feng Guifen, 
Yan Fu, etc.), who followed him in distinguishing the cultural and the political entities of 
China and offered technical, pragmatic advice to China for the purpose of national 
salvation, disregarding its cultural source of inspiration. 
 
 
The two-stage demise of Confucianism in matter and in form 
 
          In Lin Yu-Sheng’s famous study of the Chinese totalistic iconoclasm, he provides 
two reasons for the anti-tradition sentiments of the May Fourth period: first, the fall of 
traditional imperial order in 1912; second, the abuse of tradition by the reactionary 
political activities of Yuan Shikai and Zhang Xun in the 1910s. However, this 
explanation fails to address the issue of anti-tradition sentiments in the late Qing period 
before the fall of the imperial order. According to my explanation, what Lin Yu-Sheng 
talks about in his book was only the second stage of the two-stage demise of 
Confucianism: its demise in form. The first stage of the demise, or arguably the true 
decline and fall of the Confucian tradition, happened long before the 1911 Revolution in 
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the early decades of the Qing Dynasty. With the background of minority conquest and 
rule, the Qing imperial policy to adopt and control the Confucian tradition alienated the 
Chinese intellectuals from it, although this consequence might have been completely 
unintended.  
          This two-stage demise of Confucianism paved the way for the “totalistic 
iconoclasm” of twentieth century China. The loss of original intellectual creativity in the 
Confucian tradition was the most important criterion of the demise of Confucianism in 
matter and in essence. This demise in matter enabled thinkers and writers such as Wei 
Yuan to make a distinction in their mind between the cultural and civilizational body of 
China and the political body of China. The Confucian tradition had lost its internal 
intellectual life and only lived by custom or in form. Because of this demise in matter and 
in essence, late Qing thinkers such as Yan Fu were intellectually ready to reject the 
Confucian tradition and embrace western learning as an alternative in order to save China 
from its political crisis. In 1912, when the last emperor stepped down, the last symbol to 
maintain the custom of the Confucian tradition was removed. The Confucian tradition 
saw its final demise in form, and became no longer a living tradition afterwards. The tide 
of totalistic iconoclasm followed later in the decade, “prepared” by the historical process 
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